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PSA & Attestation

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Yogesh Deshpande, Abeezar Burhan, Thomas Fossati Feb'20

Agenda


- IoT Security Challenges
- PSA building trust in IoT
- PSA Attestation
- Practical use cases of attestation
- arm view of reference IoT implementation

IoT Diversity Demands a Different Approach

Many cloud services needing to trust the data & therefore trust the devices

10,000's OEMs

100's of chip vendors with different RoT




IoT Diversity Demands a Different Approach


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
100's of chip vendors with different RoT



Trust is Essential for Digital Transformation



IoT Developers Face Challenges Such As




Differentiate by means of proven security functionality showing **accountability**

Protect themselves from **liability** claims and recalls

Meet private and public compliance requirements as precondition for access to market



Typical Challenges of the IoT Industry



IoT developers are **experts on services and product** execution, not on security.

Hardware and software providers need to differentiate gaining visibility and recognition in the IoT ecosystem.

Lack of IoT product security comes at a price: hundreds of norms and regulations introduced around the world + + + + + + + + + + + + + +





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Platform Security Architecture

A complete security offering – openly published. Independently tested.



Threat models & security analyses



Architect

Hardware & firmware architect specifications

01001



Implement

Firmware source code



Certify $\overbrace{}$






Platform Security Architecture

- Analyse with Threat Models and Security Analyses
 - Identify the assets that needs protection
 - All potential threats
 - Scope and Severity of these threats
 - > Different Types of attacker and the methods they might use to exploit vulnerabilities
 - Define security objectives and create security requirements.
- Create a System Architecture that meets security requirements and is according to PSA Architecture specification. Adheres to following specifications:
 - PSA Security Model
 - Factory initialization
 - Hardware platform requirements
 - Firmware Framework
- Implement with Trusted Firmware-M
- Certify with PSA Certified and PSA Functional API Specification

Platform Security Architecture


PSA Components



PSA – Example of Analyse

Threat Models and Security Analyses






PSA – Root of Trust

Source of integrity and confidentiality

Separates critical security functions in a Secure Processing Environment (SPE) from rest of system


Typically used for secure boot, storing secrets, crypto, attestation, audit logs...

Developed by chip vendors (for example, by porting Trusted Firmware-M open source software to secure hardware)





PSA Compliant - Software Architecture – IOT Device



PSA Certified – An Overview

Building trust through independent testing



Dedicated to PSA-RoT enabled chips, devices and platforms



Builds on IoT threat models, PSA docs, Government best practice & protection profiles

Simple three-level scheme



Scalable to IoT ecosystem



Backed by reputable experts



Supporting complementary vertical evaluations






PSA Certification - How it Works

- PSA Certified provides three progressive levels of security assurance/robustness: PSA Certified Level 1, 2 and 3
- PSA Functional API Certified enables ecosystem through a consistent highlevel interface to the PSA-RoT





PSA Certified Levels

PSA Certified Levels

| PSA
Certification
Level | Silicon | OS | OEM |
|-------------------------------|---------|-------------|------------|
| L3
Months | ✓ | Third-party | evaluation |
| L2
1 month | ✓ | sche | emes |
| L1
1 day | ✓ | ~ | ~ |

Three assurance levels

Level 1: Document & Declare with lab check

- Security Model goals, government requirements
- IoT threat models Security Functional Requirements
- Lab check of questionnaire

Level 2: Mid Level assurance/robustness

- Time-limited white box testing
- Protection Profiles, eval methodology and attack methods

Level 3: Substantial

More extensive attacks

e.g. Side Channel, perturbation

• Higher assurance







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PSA Attestation


- Attestation Tokens are small reports that are produced by a device upon request. These tokens are collection of "Key/Value" pairs known as **claims**.
- Claims can relate to device own pedigree, or health or pretty much anything one wants the device to attest about.
- Collected data can originate from the Root of Trust, or any protected area (secure element, TrustZone, container), or from non-protected areas, in which case they are clearly marked as such.
- Tokens are attested because they are signed by devices using device specific unique cryptographic key.

PSA Certified Devices Support Attestation Tokens

EAT is a crypto signed "report card" with useful claims

Can be consumed by higher level attestation schemes

"HW Version" claim used as a chip class ID that can be used to look up PSA Certified level on www.psacertified.org




PSA Attestation – Token Encoding

- "Concise Binary Object Representation" (CBOR, <u>http://cbor.io</u>)
- Compact code and data representation for IoT
- Standards based (RFC 7049), quite mature

Handles multiple data types, with open source implementations and tools

Data types are simple & powerful – a claim can be a simple integer or have a complex internal structure; allows for optional data



Four Aspects of Standardization


- 1. General Structuring and Representation of Claims
- Labeling of claims
- Optionality of claims
- Flexible data representation integers, strings, binary...
- 2. Meaning of Individual Claims
- Interoperability between devices and servers from different vendors

3. Signing Format

- Accommodate different schemes and algorithms
- 4. Encryption Format (optional)
- Accommodate different algorithms

PSA Attestation – Token Signing

- CBOR Object Signing and Encryption ("COSE")
- An IoT-oriented format for signing and/or encrypting a payload
- Much simpler and more compact than PKCS #7, CMS and JOSE
- COSE provides structuring of payload, algorithm identification, key identification and signature
- COSE signed tokens are small, self-secured data blobs
- Standard format (RFC 8152) allows use and development of standard / open source tools



PSA Attestation – Utilized Claims

| Claim | Mandatory | Description |
|--------------------------------|-----------|---|
| Auth Challenge | Yes | Input Object from caller. This can be a cryptographic nonce |
| Instance ID | Yes | Unique identifier of the instance. Hash of Public(IAT) Key |
| Implementation ID | Yes | Uniquely identifies the underlying immutable RoT |
| Client Id | Yes | Represents the partition ID of the caller. Signed integer, where
ive ID represent NSPE Call and +ive ID represent SPE call |
| Security LifeCycle | Yes | Represent current life cycle state of the PSA RoT |
| Boot Seed | Yes | Represents the random value created at system boot time |
| Software Components | Yes | A list of Software components that represent all the software loaded by PSA RoT. |
| No Software Measurements | Yes | Mandatory claim, only if SW Components are missing! |
| Verification Service Indicator | No | A hint used by RP, to locate a validation service for the token |
| Profile Definition | No | Name of document that described the profile of the report |
| Hardware Version | No | Provides metadata linking the token to the GDSII that went to fabrication |



CIM PSA Attestation Practical Use Cases

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How IoT world can benefit from PSA Attestation

| Smart Home/City Example Smart
Door
locks/sensors Smart Lighting | Industrial IOT Attest signals
monitoring state
or measurement
of each
equipment Fleet
Management Asset tracking | Connected
Health Care
• Attest Distress
Signals
• Catching
Counterfeits
during medical
surgeries | Others Military & Défense Miscellaneous |
|---|--|---|--|
| | PSA At | testation | |



Orm ARM view of reference IoT Implementation

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
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PSA Compliant – ARM reference IoT platform





drm Trusted Firmware

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
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Attack types

Communication Attacks

- Man in the middle
- Weak random number generator
- Code vulnerabilities
- Transport layer security (TLS)



Physical Attacks

- Fault injection: clock or power glitch, alpha ray
- Side channel analysis
- Probing, focused ion beam

Software Attacks

- Buffer overflows
- Interrupts
- Malware

Target: Security for all embedded applications

Root of trust applications - IoT **IP** Protection Valuable firmware Trusted software **Trusted hardware Trusted drivers** Secure Trusted hardware Secure Crypto TRNG* system storage Sandboxing Certified OS / functionality **Trusted drivers** Trusted Untrusted Trusted hardware Developer Ecosystem Standard, friendly affordable friendly

Trusted Firmware - <u>https://www.trustedfirmware.org/</u>

• Why choose Trusted Firmware?

- Trusted Firmware provides a reference implementation of secure world software for Armv8-A and Armv8-M. It provides SoC developers and OEMs with a reference trusted code base complying with the relevant Arm specifications.
- This firms the foundations of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) on application processors, or the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) of microcontrollers.

Availability of Trusted Firmware


- Support for Armv8-A / Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A)
- Support for Armv8-M / Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M) and relationship with Platform Security Architecture (PSA)
 - PSA provides a common security foundation for the whole IoT ecosystem. It includes many elements, including architecture specifications and threat models. An
 important part of PSA is open source firmware. *This is available in the form of Trusted Firmware-M* for Arm Cortex-M23 and Arm Cortex-M33 processors, which use Arm
 TrustZone technology.

Trusted Firmware-M

- Secure Firmware for Arm v7-M and v8-M Systems
- Provides a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Arm v7-M and v8-M devices. For v8-M devices, it leverages, Arm TrustZone technology. It is the reference implementation
 of Platform Security Architecture (PSA). PSA is a recipe for building secure connected devices from analysis to implementation. PSA consists of four elements Threat models
 and Security Analyses, Architecture Specifications, Open Source Reference Implementation (TF-M) and Certify.
- TF-M implements PSA Specifications and APIs that can be found here.
 - https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-security-architecture

TrustZone: IoT Security Foundation

Isolates trusted software, data and hardware




Enables device integrity and system recovery

- Example use cases:
 - Protection of critical assets
 - Safe crypto implementations
 - Secure remote firmware update
 - Firmware IP protection
 - Secure debug

TrustZone Technology for Armv8-M

- The Armv8-M architecture extends TrustZone technology to Cortex-M based systems,
- TrustZone reduces the potential for attack by isolating the critical security firmware and private information, such as secure boot, firmware update, and keys, from the rest of the application.
- TrustZone technology offers an efficient, system-wide approach to security with *hardware-enforced isolation* built into the CPU
- Running two domains side-by-side and sharing resources per set configuration.




*≤2 cycles

TF-M Framework

- Secure bootloader
- Secure system init
- Secure Partition Management (SPM)
- Secure function call routing
- Isolation within SPE
- Trusted services, functions
- NSPE API
- Build environment
- Test suite

• ...



arm

Introduction to TrustZone for Armv8-M

Armv8-M architecture includes optional Security Extension

Branded as Arm TrustZone for Armv8-M

Similar in concept to TrustZone for Armv8-A

• Implementation is optimized for microcontrollers

System may be partitioned between secure and non-secure software

Secure software is highly trusted

- Has access to more system resources
- Protected from access by non-trusted code

To protect the secure software the security extensions provide:

- Isolated Secure memory for code and data
- Secure execution state to run Secure code

ARMv8-M Security Extension

Provides two security domains for code to run in

- Secure and Non-secure
- PEs without the Security Extension behave as though reset into Non-secure

Hardware assists in hiding Secure state from Non-secure code / debuggers

- Debugger can be blocked from accessing PE while Secure code is running
- Hardware pushes and clears registers if non-secure code interrupts secure code
- Stack limit registers added to assist in attack mitigation

Duplicate resources to enable software and hardware isolation

- For example, dedicated stack pointers, SysTick timers and MPUs for each domain
- Non-secure code only able to access non-secure controls

Ability to expose PE's security to system

• ARM's AXI and AMBA5 AHB5 support propagation of NS attribute

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Mbed-OS

- Arm Mbed OS is a free, open source embedded operating system that includes all the necessary features to facilitate the development of IOT Connected Products.
- Mbed OS provides an abstraction layer for the microcontroller it runs on
- Mbed OS modules include
 - Standard (PSA Compliant) based security and connectivity stacks
 - RTOS Kernel
 - Middleware for storage and Networking
 - Drivers for sensors and I/O Devices
 - Remote Device Management

Mbed OS Features

- > Modular, Necessary libraries are included automatically on your device
- Secure: MultiLayer security helps to protect your IoT solution, from isolated security domains through to Mbed TLS for secure communications
- > Connected: Wide range of communication options with drivers for BLE, Ethernet, WiFi, 6LoWPAN

MBED OS Architecture

| | Ar | oplication C | ode | | | Mbe | d OS | Libraries | | | | Pelion Client | | ÷ |
|-------------|---|---------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|----------------------|------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | N | /lbed | OS API | | | | | | |
| | Mbed OS
Core | | | Mbed OS
Runtime | | | Mbe | d TLS | | | ed OS
nectivity | | | S non-IP
ctivity |
| Stre
FAT | eam / file inte | erface | Drivers | Mbed
Events | Mbed
RTOS | X.50 | 09 | SSL
TLS/DTLS | | Network Socket Interface | | | | LoRaWAN |
| - | storage | NVStore | Drivers HAL | CMSIS
RTOS | RNG
LIB | PK
Cryp | Hashing | | LWIP Stack | Nanostack | BLE | LoRaWAN
Stack | | |
| - | untime / boc | otloader | MCU
SDK | CMSI | S RTX | TRNG
CTL | | Cypher | Ethernet | WiFi | Cellular | Thread
6LoWPAN | BLE Stack
or Cordio | LoRa |
| GCC | ARM | IAR | CMSIS | Core | Timers | TRNG
HAL | | N Crypto
unctions | Eth
MAC | WiFi
EMAC | РРР | 802.15.
4 MAC | BLE HCI | LoRa
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| + | + | + - | + + | + | + | Hard | lware | Interfaces | + | + | + | + | | + + |
| ARM (| Cortex-M CPl | J & Core Peri | pherals | nerals | TRN | G | HW
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drm Mbed Cloud Client

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
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Mbed Cloud Client

- Mbed Cloud Client, (Device management client):
 - Connection Client
 - > Update client
 - Provision client
- Mbed Cloud connect service is a secure and energy efficient communication service connecting devices to Device Management.
- Standards-based protocols (OMA LwM2M, CoAP, and TLS/DTLS), designed specifically for low-power devices.

Device Management Connect



Device Management Connect system diagram


- Device Management uses LWM2M
- Communication using CoAP
- Web application connectivity to the Device Management
- End to End Channel Security

DTLS/TLS: for the connection between the device and the server.

HTTPS: for the connection between web applications and the Device Management REST APIs.

Optimizations for IoT devices.

Attestation Token Validation – Sample Exercise



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